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ACLU V. CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW AND ADVISORY BOARD:FNA1  IS THERE SALVATION FOR 
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE?  “WITH GOD ALL THINGS ARE POSSIBLE.” 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Religious faith and expression are integral and necessary components of the private lives 
of many Americans.1  The degree of importance of religion in one's private life strictly depends 
on that individual's conscience.  In the public sector, the degree to which religion may play a part 
in governmental affairs is subject to the restrictions that the Establishment Clause imposes.2  
Convictions of legal scholars as to what those restrictions are create a lack of uniformity. 3  The 
absence of uniformity renders application of the Establishment Clause problematic and subjects 
its jurisprudence to controversy.4  One of the many cases that courts have decided in the 
Establishment Clause quagmire5 is the "Ohio State Motto" case.6   
                                                 
FNa1 ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, No. 98-4106, 
2000 WL 1016751 (6th Cir. July 14, 2000) (en banc).  "The effect of the granting of a hearing en banc shall be to 
vacate the previous opinion and judgment of this court, to stay the mandate and to restore the case on the docket 
sheet as a pending appeal."  Capitol Square, 2000 WL 1016751, at *1. 
 
1 Religion provides order in the lives of the faithful, grants explanations to matters that are otherwise 
incomprehensible, and furnishes protection from the psychic instability that would inevitably arise from a life 
devoid of meaning.  Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. 
L. REV. 233, 278-79 (1989).  "Religion provides man with a spiritual anchor, with a feeling of security such as he 
can find nowhere else."  VICTOR E. FRANKL, THE DOCTOR AND THE SOUL xv (Richard Winston & Clara Winston 
trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 2d ed. 1972). 
  
2 The First Amendment of the Constitution provides, in relevant part:  "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . ." U.S. CONST . amend. I. 
 
3 See Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and the Conceptions of Self, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1984).  See also  infra notes 11-42 and accompanying text.   
 
4 See infra notes 11-42 and accompanying text. 
 
5  One commentator has remarked that the only consensus reached in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is that 
everyone is displeased with the Court's approach in this area.  William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter With 
Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion In First Amendment Jurisprudence, 
75 IND. L.J. 193, 193 (2000). 
 
6  ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, No. 98-4106, 
2000 WL 1016751 (6th Cir. July 14, 2000) (en banc).   
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 Part II of this Note provides a cursory review of the evolution of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, and it particularly focuses on the primary tests for analyzing the Establishment 
Clause that the Supreme Court has promoted over the years.7  Part III discusses the procedural 
history of the "Ohio State Motto" case with particular emphasis on the courts' decisions and their 
reasoning.8  Part IV analyzes the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth District and 
addresses some of the concerns that inhere in the decision. 9  Finally, Part V concludes the Note.10 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Ever since the Supreme Court applied the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,11 Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been 
in a disconcerting state.12  Much of the chaos has centered around the Supreme Court’s 
unwillingness to adhere to one doctrinal perspective.13  In analyzing Establishment Clause issues, 
the Supreme Court has used three separate and distinct doctrinal approaches: strict separation, 
accommodation, and flexible accommodation. 14  
                                                 
7 See infra notes 11-42 and accompanying text. 
 
8 See infra notes 43-74 and accompanying text. 
  
9 See infra notes 82-143 and accompanying text.  
 
10 See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text. 
 
11 E.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion In the United 
States: Fin De Siecle Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295, 316 (2000).  
 
12 Ralph W. Johnson III, Lee v. Weisman: Easy Cases Make Bad Law Too — The Direct Coercion Test Is the 
Appropriate Establishment Clause Standard , 2 GEO. MASON INDEP . L. REV. 123, 124 (1993). 
 
13 Shahin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos In Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 
AM. U. L. REV. 503, 506 (1990). 
 
14 Id. Separationists believe that the Establishment Clause commands federal and state governments to be completely 
religion-neutral. Id. at 508. Given the importance of religion in America, accomodationists argue that complete 
neutrality is implausible in today’s society and that a certain level of religious “accommodation” is constitutional. 
Id. at 511-12. Flexible accomodationists believe that the Establishment Clause simply prohibits the government 
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In 1947, the Supreme Court decided Everson v. Board of Education15 and announced that 
the Establishment Clause commands a “wall of separation”16 between church and state.17  Yet, 
after making this pronouncement, the Everson Court upheld a Board of Education resolution that 
provided tax-supported bus transportation to students of both public and parochial schools.18  
The decision was antithetical to the Court’s pronouncement.19  To confuse matters more, almost 
five years later, in Zorach v. Clauson, the Court undermined its own foundational 
pronouncements for Establishment Clause analysis when it stated that the First Amendment does 
not require separation of church and state in “every and all respects.”20   
                                                                                                                                                             
from instituting a common church. Id. at 521.  But see Jennifer H. Greenhalgh, Notes and Comments, The 
Establishment Clause and Government Religious Displays:  The Court That Stole Christmas, 15 TOURO L. REV. 
1053, 1074-75 (referring to two distinct schools of thought: separationists and accomodationists).  
 
15 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).   
 
16 “Wall of separation” is a phrase that Thomas Jeffe rson first used in a reply letter to the Danbury Baptist 
Association.  Roy S. Moore, Religion In the Public Square, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 347, 357 (1998-99).   
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God; that he 
owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the 
government reach action only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of 
the whole American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of 
separation between church and State. 
 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Thomas Jefferson’s reply letter to a question posed by 
the Danbury Baptist Association). 
 
17 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.  Not only did the Everson Court command a “wall of separation” between church and 
state, it also emphasized that the “wall must be kept high and impregnable.” Id. at 18. 
 
18 Id. at 18. 
 
19 Rezai, supra  note 13, at 511. 
 
20 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).  The Zorach Court expressed the sentiment that complete separation 
of church and state would lead to alienation between the two systems, which would, in turn, lead to hostility.  Id.  
The decision in Zorach opened the door to the less extreme accomodationist approach to Establishment Clause 
analysis.  Christian M. Keiner, A Critical Analysis of Continuing Establishment Clause Flux As Illustrated By Lee v. 
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) and Graduation Prayer Case Law: Can Mutual Tolerance Reconcile Dynamic 
Principles of Religious Diversity and Human Commonality, 24 PAC. L.J. 401, 410 (1993). 
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It was not until 1963 that the Court in School District of Abington v. Schempp decided to 
transform Establishment Clause theory into a workable “purpose and effect” test.21  The Court 
adopted and refined the “purpose and effect” test in Lemon v. Kurtzman22 by adding a third 
prong to the analysis.23  The “Lemon test,”24 as it came to be known in the legal community, 
became the standard of Establishment Clause analysis.25 However, the three-pronged Lemon test, 
that the 1. government action must have secular purpose;26 2. effect of government action must 
not principally inhibit or encourage religion; and 3. government action must not become 
excessively entangled with religion, 27 has lost support in the Court over the years and, thus has 
lost much of its efficacy. 28  As the Lemon test has progressively waned, the endorsement test29 
has advanced to the forefront.   
                                                 
21 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).  The Court spoke of separation between church and state in terms 
of government neutrality toward religion and stated that the requirement of neutrality is met when government 
action advances a secular purpose and does not have a primary effect of favoring or inhibiting religion. Id. at 222.   
 
22 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 
23 The third prong declares that the government action must not encourage excessive entanglement between church 
and state. Id. at 613. 
 
24 The Lemon test is basically an amalgam of the School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) decision and the 
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), decision.  The first two elements of the Lemon test are simply the 
“purpose and effect” tests that the Court announced in Schempp.  See supra note 21.  The third prong of the Lemon 
test derived from language in Walz expressing that it “must also be sure that the end result—the effect—is not an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.”  Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.  The Lemon test represents the strict 
separationist school of thought.  Greenhalgh, supra  note 14, at 1091. 
 
25 Keiner, supra note 20, at 415. 
 
26 The Court normally must grant deference to the legislature as to what the secular purpose is that is underlying the 
government action.  See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 6 (1947).  Invalidation of government action under 
the first prong of the Lemon test can only occur if the government action is devoid of any secular purpose and fully 
motivated by a religious objective. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).  But see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 690-91 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the purpose prong requirement is “not satisfied, 
however, by the mere existence of some secular purpose, however dominated by religious purposes”); Stone v. 
Graham 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (expressing that “no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind 
us” in believing that there is a secular purpose to the posting of the Ten Commandments). 
 
27 Lemon, 403 U.S at 613. 
 
28 On several occasions, the Court has commented that the Lemon test is only one approach in analyzing 
Establishment Clause cases.  In fact, some members of the Court view the Lemon test as a dispensable approach and 
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The endorsement test is an attempt to apply the underpinnings of the Lemon test in a way 
that is more flexible and more cognizant of the particular circumstances of each case.30 The two 
elements of the endorsement test are whether the government intended to endorse religion 
through its actions,31 and whether the government sends a message of endorsement through its 
actions, regardless if the government intended to send the message.32 The first time that a 
majority of the Court used the endorsement test exclusively33 to analyze an Establishment Clause 
                                                                                                                                                             
not a steadfast rule that needs to be strictly followed.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (emphasizing that the Court is 
unwilling “to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area” of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (stating that the Lemon test is simply a “helpful 
signpost” in Establishment Clause analysis).  But see Lynch, 465 U.S. at 695-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting 
that the Court needs to rigorously adhere to the Lemon test in all Establishment Clause cases). 
 
29 The endorsement test originated from Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.  Justice 
O’Connor extrapolated the “purpose and effect” prongs of the Lemon test and redefined them: 
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or 
disapprove of religion.  The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual 
purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.  An 
affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged practice invalid. 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
In another concurring opinion Justice O’Connor exemplified the flexibility of the endorsement test when 
she suggested that the government’s mere acknowledgement of religion in law or policy does not violate the 
Establishment Clause.  Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  The endorsement test represents the 
accomodationist school of thought.  Greenhalgh, supra  note 14, at 1075. 
 
30 Keiner, supra  note 20, at 417.  Inquiry under the endorsement test is context -specific and should take into account 
history, effects of ubiquity on religious significance, and particular circumstances of each case.  Wallace, 472 U.S. at 
74, 76, 81 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
31 A majority of cases applying the Lemon test used a deferential standard in gauging whether a secular purpose 
existed for the governmental action. See supra  note 26.  Under the endorsement test analysis, Justice O’Connor 
reemphasized the need to be “deferential and limited” in considering what the purpose of the legislature was in 
enacting the law.  Wallace, 472 U.S. at 74-75 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  However, she granted more leeway to the 
Court to inquire whether the secular purpose was “sincere” or a “sham.”  Id. at 75. 
 
32 Justice O’Connor defined “endorsement” as sending “a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.”  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  In applying this 
definition, Justice O’Connor uses an informed observer standard and asks “whether an objective observer, 
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive [the government 
action] as a state endorsement of religion.”  Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  But see Capitol 
Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 807-08 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that 
the objective observer test should utilize a person who is not knowledgeable in history or legislative text). 
 
33 In School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), the Court 
applied the Lemon test to invalidate the challenged governmental act but used Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test 
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case was in County of Allegheny v. ACLU.34  Ironically, in the same case, Justice Kennedy 
introduced yet another alternative approach to Establishment Clause analysis in his dissenting 
and concurring opinion. 35  Justice Kennedy’s alternative approach, the coercion test, would 
invalidate governmental action only where the government compels individuals to participate 
religiously or where the government’s actions directly benefit a particular sect to such a 
dangerous extent so as to establish a state or federal religion. 36  The coercion test is theoretically 
distant, if not polarized, from the “separation of church and state” foundation that the Court laid 
in Everson in 1947.37   
                                                                                                                                                             
definition as to what constitutes “effect.”  William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: The Supreme Court 
and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 520, 521 (1986). 
 
34 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).  In Allegheny, the Court faced a constitutional challenge to a 
Christmas crèche display located inside the county courthouse and a Chanukah menorah display outside of the 
county building.  Id. at 573.  The Christmas crèche, which depicted the biblical nativity scene, was in an area of the 
courthouse that the Court felt was the “main,” “most beautiful,” “most public” part.  Id.  The 18-foot menorah was 
outside of the courthouse next to a Christmas tree that stood 45 feet in height.  Id.  In upholding the constitutionality 
of the menorah but finding the nativity scene unconstitutional, the Supreme Court looked to the particular physical 
setting of each display.  Id. at 575-76.  The Court articulated that the menorah is a primary symbol of Judaism and 
standing alone would be unconstitutional.  Id. at 575.  However, the menorah coupled with the Christmas tree, 
popularly held to be a secular symbol of Christmas, relays “a message of pluralism and freedom of belief during the 
holiday season.”  Id.  The Court further held that a reasonable observer would not view the menorah display as 
endorsing Judaism.  Id. at 575-76.   
 
35 Id. at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 
36 Id. at 659.  Justice Kennedy would hold both displays in Allegheny constitutional using the newly proposed 
coercion test.  Id. at 655.  Proponents of the coercion test suggest that it carries out the original intent of the framers 
of the Constitution and the Establishment Clause.  Johnson III, supra  note 12, at 179-80.  Proponents trace the 
development of the text of the Establishment clause to statements that James Madison made in the House of 
Representatives on June 8, 1789.  Id. at 180-81.  James Madison expressed that the “civil rights of none shall be 
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full 
and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or any pretext, infringed.” 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 25 
(Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).  Further, Madison understood the words of the Establishment 
Clause to preclude Congress from establishing a particular religion or from compelling individuals to worship in “a 
manner contrary to their conscience.” Id. at 93.  For further analysis of the framers original intent see generally 
Johnson III, supra  note 12. 
 
37 The coercion test is a judicial “hands off” approach to the Establishment Clause.  See Keiner, supra  note 20, at 
423.  It represents the flexible accomodationist approach.  See supra  note 14.  The coercion test recognizes that the 
United States is a representative democracy that allows the majority constituency to speak via the legislature.  See 
Johnson III, supra note 12, at 191.  Thus, the legislature may publicize the views of the majority without violating 
the Establishment Clause so long as it does not prohibit the minority from exercising its own conscience or directly 
compel the minority to adopt the beliefs of the majority.  See id. at 192.  By acting in a fashion that accommodates 
6
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Holding true to its proclamation that it is not bound by a single test in the sensitive 
Establishment Clause area,38 the justices in Marsh v. Chambers39 abandoned all three tests 
discussed above and conducted a historical analysis40 into the challenged governmental 
practice.41 To this day, 53 years after the application of the First Amendment to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court justices remain irreconcilably divided as 
to the proper meaning of, and approach to, the Establishment Clause.42  As a result, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the beliefs of one religious sect, the government does not impermissibly compel nonadherents to convert to that sect.  
See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that neither a 
Christmas crèche nor Chanukah menorah compels nonadherents of Christianity or Judaism to adopt Christian or 
Jewish beliefs); Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 732 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (intimating that creating 
a school district specifically for followers of the Satmar Hasidim religion does not rise to the level of establishing a 
religion and, thus, does not violate the Establishment Clause). 
 
38 E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971). 
 
39 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 
40 The history and tradition of a particular practice is not, in itself, a test with which to examine Establishment 
Clause cases, and “[s]tanding alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional 
guarantees . . . .”  Id. at 790.  But see Books v. City of Elkhart, 79 F. Supp. 2d 979, 989-93 (N.D. Ind. 1999) 
(reporting five separate Establishment Clause tests including the “Historical Precedent Test”).  See generally Moore, 
supra  note 16, at 372-73. 
 
41 Nebraska’s tradition of opening every legislative session with a publicly-paid chaplain’s prayer was the 
challenged practice in Marsh. Marsh , 463 U.S. at 784-85.  The Supreme Court held:  
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt 
that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our 
society.  To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in 
these circumstances, an “establishment” of religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a 
tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this country. 
Id. at  792.  Like the majority in Marsh , Justice Brennan would also inquire into the history of a particular 
government practice that is religious in nature to see if the practice has lost its religious meaning through ubiquitous 
use.  E. Gregory Wallace, When the Government Speaks Religiously, 21 FLA. ST . U. L. REV. 1183, 1216 (1994). 
Religious practices that have become secularized pass muster under an Establishment Clause attack because they are 
a form of acceptable “ceremonial deism.” Id.  
While I remain uncertain about these questions, I would suggest the such practices as the 
designation of “In God We Trust” as our national motto, or the references to God contained in the 
Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can best be understood, in Dean Rostow’s apt phrase, as a form of 
a “ceremonial deism,” protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have 
lost through rote repetition any significant religious content. 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 
42 Keiner, supra  note 20, at 459. 
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence continues its journey on a road paved with uncertainty, 
without a map or compass. 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1959, three years after Congress adopted “In God We Trust” as the national motto,43 
the Ohio State Legislature adopted the phrase, “With God All Things Are Possible,” as Ohio’s 
state motto.44  Legislative history is lacking, but newspapers and other “contemporary 
documents” trace the enactment to the efforts of a 12-year-old boy45 who chose the phrase from 
Matthew 19:26.46  Since 1959, many government officials have been using the motto on official 
documents and other official forms.47   
                                                 
43 36 U.S.C. § 302 (1998). 
 
44 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5.06 (West 2000). 
 
45 ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1177-78 (S.D. Ohio 1998), rev’d , 210 
F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2000).  The boy, James Mastronado, began petitioning the Ohio Legislature approximately three 
years prior to the adoption of the motto.  ACLU v. Capitol Square and Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 711 (6th Cir. 
2000), reh’g granted, No. 98-4106, 2000 WL 1016751 (6th Cir. 2000) July 14, 2000 (en banc).  Apparently, the boy 
was concerned that Ohio was the only state without a motto since the General Assembly of Ohio repealed the 
original motto, “Imperium in Imperio,” in 1867.  Capitol Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1177-78. 
46 Capitol Square, 210 F.3d at 711.  Matthew 19:26 is a response of Jesus to a question that begins at Matthew 
19:16.  Matthew 19:16-26 reads: 
And, behold, one came and said unto him, “Good Master, what good thing shall I do, that I may 
have eternal life?”  And he said unto him, “Why callest thou me good?  There is none good but 
one, that is, God: but if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.”  He said unto him, 
“Which?”  Jesus said, “Thou shalt do no murder, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not 
steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Honour thy father and thy mother: and, Thou shalt love 
thy neighbour as thyself.  The young man said unto him, “All these things have I kept from my 
youth up: what lack I yet?”  Jesus said unto him, “If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, 
and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me.”  But when 
the young man heard that saying, he went away sorrowful: for he had great possessions.  Then said 
Jesus unto his disciples, “Verily I say unto you, That a rich man shall hardly enter into the 
kingdom of heaven.  And again I say unto you, It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a 
needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.”  When the disciples heard it, they, 
were exceedingly amazed, saying, “Who then can be saved?”  But Jesus beheld them, and said 
unto them, “With men this is impossible; but with God all things are possible.” 
Matthew 19:16-26 (King James) (emphasis added). 
 
47 Successive Secretaries of State, the State Tax Commissioner, and other officials have used the motto on their 
official forms.  Capitol Square, 210 F.3d at 710. 
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The constitutionality of the Ohio motto had gone unchallenged until 1996 when the 
ACLU of Ohio sought a declaratory judgment asking the District Court to find that “With God 
All Things Are Possible” is unconstitutional. 48  The ACLU also sought to enjoin the government 
from carrying out its plan49 to inscribe the words of the motto in the Capitol Square Plaza, 
located outside of the state house.50  The District Court refused to enjoin the inscription of  “With 
God All Things Are Possible” on the state plaza, announcing that Ohio’s use of its official motto 
was constitutional. 51  However, in a bizarre dispositional order, the district court enjoined Ohio 
from crediting the origin of the motto to Jesus’ words found in Matthew 19:26.52  In reaching this 
conclusion, the District Court primarily relied on the similarities between the national motto53 
and the Ohio motto.54   
                                                 
48 Capitol Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1178. 
 
49 The plan originated with then-Governor of Ohio, George Voinovich.  Capitol Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d  at 1178.  
Upon returning from a trip to India where Governor Voinovich observed an inscription reading, “Government Work 
Is God’s Work,” he suggested the Advisory Board inscribe Ohio’s motto on the courthouse entrance.  Id. The 
Advisory Board accepted the Governor’s proposal with variations.  Id. 
 
50 ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 704-05 (6th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, No. 98-
4106, 2000 WL 1016751 (6th Cir. July 14, 2000) (en banc).  Although the inscription of the motto on public 
grounds was what gave rise to the action, the ACLU challenged all uses of the Ohio state motto by the government.  
Id. at 705 n.2. 
 
51 ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1998), rev’d, 210 F.3d 
703 (6th Cir. 2000). 
  
52 Id.  The district court did not announce its reasons for doing so.  Id. 
 
53 The national motto also has it origins in religious text, particularly the Hebrew Bible.  Id. at 1179.  “In God I have 
put my trust.”  Psalms 56:11 (King James).  Removed from their context, both the national and Ohio mottoes are 
“generically theistic.”  Capitol Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.  When governmental speech is generically theistic, it 
is not an “endorsement” of a particular religion, and, thus, does not violate the Establishment clause.  See id. 
 
54 Capitol Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1180-84.  Through its analysis, the court suggested that “With God, All Things 
Are Possible” has become a form of an acceptable “ceremonial deism.”  Cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 
(1983) (holding that opening legislative sessions with a chaplain’s prayers has become part of the “fabric of our 
society”); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963) (alluding that the extensive use of official mottoes, 
oaths of office, and legislative practices with religious undertones are constitutional because they are interwoven 
into this country’s history and tradition). 
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The Court reasoned that, because the Supreme Court has spoken about the 
constitutionality of the national motto on several occasions in dicta,55 the Ohio motto must also 
be constitutional. 56  Further, the Court articulated that the Ohio motto survives scrutiny under 
both the Lemon and endorsement tests.57  The motto serves a legitimate secular purpose because 
it “inculcates hope, makes Ohio unique, solemnizes occasions, and acknowledges the humility 
that government leaders frequently feel in grappling with difficult public policy issues.”58 Also, 
in a cursory fashion, the Court conc luded that the Ohio motto satisfies the “effect and 
entanglement” prongs 59 of the Lemon test and the “endorsement” prong60 of the endorsement 
test.61   
                                                 
55 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 450 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (explaining that the words “In God 
We Trust” simply recognize the religious traditions of this country and do not constitute an official religion); Lynch 
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (claiming that the national motto serves the 
“legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging 
the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society”); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 303 (alluding that the words in 
the national motto may not offend the Establis hment Clause because they are interwoven in the “fabric of society”) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
 
56 After assessing cases that refer to the constitutionality of the national motto, Pledge of Allegiance, and opening 
each day’s session of the Supreme Court with “God save the United States and this Honorable Court,” the district 
court in Capitol Square declared, “[i]f the various actions of the federal government reviewed above do not offend 
the Establishment Clause, there can be little doubt that Ohio’s motto ‘With God All Things Are Possible’ does not.”  
Capitol Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1183. 
 
57 ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1182-83 (S.D. Ohio 1998), rev’d , 210 
F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2000). 
58 Id. at 1182.  The court’s list of reasons sufficiently satisfies the first prong of both the Lemon and endorsement 
tests.  Id. 
 
59 “Viewed in the context of a long tradition of government acknowledgement of religion in mottoes, oaths, and 
anthems, the Ohio motto does not have the primary or principal purpose of advancing religion, and it does not foster 
excessive government entanglement with religion.”  Id. 
 
60 The court notes that the Ohio motto is merely an admissible acknowledgement of religion and not an endorsement 
of religion much like other ubiquitous practices, such as assigning Thanksgiving as a national holiday, inscribing “In 
God we trust” on currency, opening legislative sessions with prayer, and opening sessions to the Supreme Court 
with “God save the United States and this Honorable Court.”  Id. at 1183. 
 
61 Id. at 1182-83. 
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision 
and declared Ohio’s use of its official motto unconstitutional. 62  The Court’s analysis primarily 
depended on the “effects” prong of the Lemon test and the “endorsement” prong of the 
endorsement test.63  In reaching its conclusion, the appeals court emphasized the need to analyze 
the Ohio motto under an “objective observer”standard.64  An “objective observer” is one who is a 
well- informed member65 of the community rather than a regular passerby. 66  When considering 
the objective meaning of a particular governmental act, the “objective observer” must look at the 
specific context of the act.67  The Supreme Court has not had occasion to extend contextual 
                                                 
62 ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 727 (6th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, No. 98-
4106, 2000 WL 1016751 (6th Cir. July 14, 2000) (en banc). 
 
63 “We shall not discuss either the purpose or entanglement prongs of the Lemon test.”  Id. at 715.  Also, the Sixth 
Circuit focused most of its attention on the motto’s actual message conveyed to an objective observer, and did not 
analyze whether the motto contained a legitimate secular purpose.  Id. at 725.  The court analyzed the “effects” 
prong of the Lemon test under an objective observer standard, a technique unique to the endorsement test.  Id. 
 
64 Justice O’Connor first introduced the objective observer test in Lynch in order to identify the objective meaning of 
the government’s action.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  If the objective 
observer understands the government action to give a message to nonadherents that they are not members of the 
political community, then the government action is unconstitutional.  See supra  note 32 and accompanying text.  
The objective observer test does not apply to the first prong of the endorsement test because the first prong inquires 
into the subjective intent of the legislature.  See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.    
 
65 Capitol Square, 210 F.3d at 725.  The “endorsement inquiry should be conducted from the perspective of a 
hypothetical observer who is presumed to possess a certain level of information that all citizens might not share 
neither [should the hypothetical observer choose] the perceptions of the majority over those of a ‘reasonable non-
adherent . . . .’”  Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 
66 This is the definition of objective observer that Justice Stevens has advanced.  Pinette, 515 U.S. at 807-08 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  See supra  note 32. 
 
67 Context is a central consideration in the objective observer analysis.  See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  “[T]he reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and 
context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears.” Id.  “[T]he ‘history and ubiquity’ of a 
practice is relevant because it provides part of the context in which a reasonable observer evaluates whether a 
challenged governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion.”  County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 
492 U.S. 630 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Contextual inquiry into cases involving displays should also 
include the locale of the display, secular character of accompanying symbols, government disclaimers of patronage 
to religious message, religious nature of display, secular aspects of religious holiday display, and nature of the 
government’s involvement in the upkeep of display.  Andrew Rotstein, Note, Good Faith?: Religious-Secular 
Parallelism and the Establishment Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1763, 1803-04 (1993). 
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analysis beyond that of physical setting. 68  Thus, although the lower court addressed the textual 
origin of the Ohio motto, it did not give it much weight in its analysis.69  In fact, the lower court 
analyzed the motto removed from its textual origin.70   
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit proposed that 
“decontextualization” of the motto was improper.71 The Cour t relied on non-establishment clause 
precedent in order to extend its contextual inquiry to encompass the textual origin of 
governmental speech. 72  The Court went on to define an “objective observer” as an individual not 
only knowledgeable of physical setting, but also of textual origin of words.73  With this in mind, 
the Court held that an objective observer would know that the words of the motto were the words 
of Jesus, and would perceive the motto as advancing Christianity. 74 
                                                 
68 The cases where the Supreme Court has addressed the context of the governmental act are “display” cases.  E.g., 
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 753 (evaluating context of a Ku Klux Klan cross on public grounds); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573 
(addressing the context of a Christmas crèche as well as Chanukah menorah);  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668 (examining 
context of nativity scene in Christmas display).  Contextual analysis of the physical setting of a particular display, 
the “Santa Clause test,” has been called into question because it fosters uncertainty in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence since “communities will not know whether their holiday decorations are constitutional until the courts 
decide each case within its own factual context.” Rezai, supra  note 13, at 533-34. 
 
69 See ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179 (S.D. Ohio 1998), rev’d , 210 
F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2000).  
 
70 See id. at 1185. The lower court went as far as to enjoin the government from attributing the motto’s origin to the 
Bible.  Id. at 1185. 
 
71 See ACLU v. Capitol Square and Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 724-25 (6th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, No. 98-
4106, 2000 WL 1016751 (6th Cir. July 14, 2000) (en banc). 
  
72 The Sixth Circuit relied on four Supreme Court cases that reviewed issues involving statutory language 
construction.  Id.  The court relied on the following cases: Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) 
(asserting that “the meaning of language is inherently contextual”); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) 
(recognizing that the meaning of words derives from the context that contains the words); Smith v. United States, 
508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993) (observing that language must be interpreted in unison with its context); Bailey v. United 
States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (expressing that “[t]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on 
context”). 
 
73 Capitol Square, 210 F.3d at 725. 
 
74 Id.  The court held that “With God, All Things Are Possible” is Jesus’s response to how one may receive 
salvation, a “uniquely Christian thought.”  Id. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
In finding the Ohio motto unconstitutional, the Court of Appeals implicitly 
distinguished75 Ohio’s motto from the national motto.76  The court implied that the national 
motto is a form of “ceremonial deism”77 because of its rich history and tradition in public life, 
while Ohio’s motto did not enjoy such history and tradition. 78  Distinguishing the two mottoes is 
imperative because the Supreme Court has always suggested, at least in dicta, that the national 
motto is a constitutional form of governmental speech. 79  However, the reasons for 
distinguishing the two mottoes that the court announced – or implied – seem to be illusory; they 
were results-driven and devoid of any practical standards to apply to future Establishment Clause 
analysis.80 Additionally, the textually aware “reasonable observer” is a standard that can 
potentially limit governmental speech beyond what the Framers intended the Establishment 
Clause to address.81  
                                                 
75 Rather, the court conducts a historical review of legislative history and cases involving the national motto and the 
Pledge of Allegiance.  Id. at 719-22.  However, the court does not analyze how the Ohio motto and the national 
motto or Pledge of Allegiance are different in a manner resulting in the unconstitutionality of the former and 
constitutionality of the latter.  Id. at 722-27.  The Court of Appeals primarily bases its decision on the message that 
the Ohio motto conveys to an objective observer who is knowledgeable about the text and background of the text.  
Id. at 727.  In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Court of Appeals does nothing to dispel the lower court’s 
position that the Ohio motto is fundamentally similar to the national motto and thus should be treated alike.  See 
Capitol Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1181-84. 
  
76 ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (S.D. Ohio 1998), rev’d, 210 F.3d 703 
(6th Cir. 2000). 
 
77 ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 210 F. Supp. 3d 703, 721-22 (6th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, 
No. 98-4106, 2000 WL 1016751 (6th Cir. July 14, 2000) (en banc).  For an explanation of what constitutes a 
“ceremonial deism,” see supra  notes 41 and 54 and accompanying text. 
 
78 Contra Capitol Square, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1178 (stating that the Ohio motto has been used by Secretaries of State 
and other government officials since its adoption in 1959). 
 
79 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 
303 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 450 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 
80 See infra  notes 82-143 and accompanying text. 
 
81 See infra  notes 131-43 and accompanying text  
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A.  National Motto, Ohio Motto: Is there a Difference? 
 The Court of Appeals’ reversal of the District Court's ruling largely depended on the 
newly reconstructed “objective observer” standard.82  In light of the fact that the District Court 
upheld Ohio's motto based on its similarities83 to the national motto, the Court of Appeals did not 
satisfactorily explain how and why an “objective observer” would consider the Ohio motto 
differently than this “observer” would consider the national motto under the Establishment 
Clause.84  The difference in treatment between Ohio’s motto and the national motto be based 
solely on the textual origin of the Ohio motto because the national motto also has its origins in 
the Bible.85  The religious significance and character of each motto may be one of the 
possibilities for the difference in treatment.86  "With God All Things Are Possib le" emanates 
from Jesus' words in the New Testament of the Christian Bible 87 and relays a "uniquely Christian 
                                                 
82 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit announced: 
We believe that we are required to view the words of the motto as part of the text in which they 
are found and give to them, as reasonable observers, the meaning intended by Jesus when he 
addressed his disciples as reported by Matthew in the New Testament of the Christian Bible. 
ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 210 F. Supp. 3d 703, 727 (6th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, No. 
98-4106, 2000 WL 1016751 (6th Cir. July 14, 2000) (en banc).  See also  supra  note 72 for a list of cases that the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit used to create this definition. 
 
83 See supra  note 56 and accompanying text. 
 
84  Several Courts of Appeals have addressed the constitutionality of "In God we trust" as the national motto, and all 
have reached the conclusion that the motto is constitutional.  E.g., Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214 (10th Cir. 
1996); O'Hair v. Murray, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1978); Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 
85 The national motto evolved from the Old Testament, "In God I have put my trust."  Psalms 56:11 (King James).  
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals does not appear to place any value on the fact that the national motto originated 
from the Old Testament while the Ohio motto originated from the New Testament.  Capitol Square, 210 F.3d at 703.  
The court does however distinguish the Ohio motto from other mottoes that reference “God” by the fact that the 
Ohio motto is a direct passage in the Bible.  Id. at 711. 
 
86 Capitol Square, 210 F.3d at 728-30 (Merritt, J., concurring). 
  
87 Matthew 19:26 (King James). 
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thought."88  However, Jesus was merely paraphrasing words that Job had vocalized in an earlier 
century. 89  The words were Job’s and not Jesus' own. 90  The message conveyed cannot be 
“uniquely Christian” because Job is also a figure in the Hebrew Bible.91 
Even if the words of the Ohio motto were Jesus' own, it is difficult to characterize the 
message conveyed to an “objective observer” as "uniquely Christian" because both Islamic and 
Jewish religious texts contain analogous verses.92  The Court reasoned that although the 
decontextualized motto speaks generally about the omnipotence of God,93 it speaks about 
salvation94 when it is read in context of the biblical passage.95  However, there are viable 
competing interpretations to the passage in question. 96  These interpretations are based on 
                                                 
88 Capitol Square, 210 F.3d at 725.  
 
89 "When Jesus said, 'With God all things are possible,' he was echoing the words spoken by Job centuries earlier . . . 
."  ‘I know that you can do all things, and that no purpose of yours can be hindered.’ - Job 42:1-2."  Jeff Jacoby, The 
ACLU and the G-Word, BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 2000, at A19.  Similarly, the words of the national motto were 
those of King David, who is not an important figure only for Christians.  Psalms 56:11 (King James). 
 
90 Jacoby, supra  note 89, at A19. 
 
91 See supra note 89 and accompanying text and infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
 
92  "Know you not that God is able to do all things?"  Koran Cons 2:106;  “Wheresoever ye are, God will bring you 
Together.  For God Hath power over all things.”  Koran Cons 2:148;  "Then Job answered the Lord and said:  I 
know that you can do all things, and that no purpose of yours can be hindered."  Job 42:1-2 (King James); “Is 
anything too hard for the Lord?”  Job 42:2 (King James);  “I know that thou canst do everything.”  Jeremiah 32:17 
(King James). 
 
93 The court emphasized that the phrase, "With God, All Things Are Possible," is "generically theistic." ACLU v. 
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179 (S.D. Ohio 1998), rev’d, 210 F.3d 703 (6th 
Cir. 2000). 
 
94 The Court of Appeals interprets salvation as strictly Christian in nature. ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and 
Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 726 (6th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, No. 98-4106, 2000 WL 1016751 (6th Cir. July 14, 
2000) (en banc).  That the motto conveys ideals regarding salvation is the crux of the Sixth Circuit’s decision to 
render the motto unconstitutional.  The court inherently concludes that salvation is a uniquely Christian concept.  Id.  
Contra  Ingber, supra note 1, at 279-81 (regarding the concept of salvation as a foundational element of most 
religions). 
 
95 The context of the motto includes verses 16-26 of chapter 19 from the book of Matthew.  See supra  note 46 and 
accompanying text. 
 
96 Pastor Peterson, a Presbyterian pastor and the plaintiff’s expert, suggests that the scripture, Matthew 19:16-26, 
specifically refers to salvation.  Capitol Square, 210 F.3d at 708.  On the other hand, David Belcastro, associate 
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individual perspectives, belief systems, and perceptions.97  Discourse on which interpretation is 
correct constitutes "theological dialogue" and has no place in court.98  When a court chooses one 
viable religious interpretation over the other,99 ironically, the court undermines the Establishment 
Clause’s demand for government to remain neutral. 100  Consequently, the court cannot base its 
decision to treat the national motto differently from the Ohio motto on its own choice to favor an 
"unconstitutional" interpretation of what the motto conveys over a "constitutional" one.101   
                                                                                                                                                             
professor at Capital University for the Religious Studies department and the defendant’s expert, attests that the 
passage refers to discipleship.  Id. at 709.  Pastor Peterson concedes that the competing interpretations are both 
viable.  Id. at 708. 
 
97 Interpretation of words and symbols is highly subjective.  See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL 
PAPERS 266-70 (1920) (stating "[w]e live by symbols, and what shall be symbolized by any image of the sight 
depends upon the mind of him who sees it").  Perception is a physiological concept that refers to the organization of 
external data in the human brain.  CAROLE WADE & CAROL TAVRIS, PSYCHOLOGY 183-87 (3d ed. 1993).  
Physiological perception is much like a video camera filming an event while psychological perception is how an 
individual assesses the significance of the data that the camera recorded.  Id.  Although the data collected is the 
same, each individual interprets it differently, especially when the data is ambiguous.  Id.  Since words and concepts 
that humans use are inherently confusing and ambiguous, Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal 
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 321-22 (1987), 
psychological factors and cultural factors weigh in as to how one interprets data, WADE & TAVRIS, supra , at 183-87.  
A person's own needs, beliefs, expectations and emotions influence his or her interpretation of the world.  Id.  Since 
every person has needs, expectations, beliefs, and emotions that no other human being shares, every person's 
interpretation of the world, its symbols, or words will vary, at least slightly.  See id.  A perfect example of differing 
interpretations of the same data is when an apartment building in a French town experienced water damage and 
many people thought it a miracle because they thought that the water stain depicted the face of Jesus.  Id. 
 
98 The expert for the plaintiff, Pastor Peterson, testified that discourse over what Matthew 19:16-26 means is 
theological discussion that "needs to be taking place in synagogues and churches and mosques around the state."  
Capitol Square, 210 F.3d at 708-09. 
 
99 For example, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit  chose to accept that Matthew 19:16-26 refers to salvation 
rather than discipleship as the defendant's expert contended.  See Capitol Square, 210 F.3d at 726.  
 
100 The effect of the Establishment Clause is to preclude the state from preferring one religion over the other.  
Wallace, supra  note 41, at 1189.  Both the endorsement test and the Lemon test advance that the principle of 
neutrality underlies the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 1190.  Neutrality requires the government to treat all religions 
equally and cannot prefer or disparage any religion, School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963), and to treat 
religion and irreligion equally, County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 644 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 
101 In choosing an interpretation in a neutral fashion, the court must adhere to steadfast criteria for analysis.  See 
Smith, supra  note 97, at 328.  Such criteria do not exist in Establishment Clause jurisprudence because there is no 
universal perspective through which an "objective observer" may evaluate government action.  See Kenneth L. 
Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
503, 516-17 (1992).  The pluralistic society of the United States exacerbates the implausibility of the objective 
observer test.  Id.  "Is the objective observer . . . a religious person, an agnostic, a separationist, a person sharing the 
predominant religious sensibility of the community, or one holding a minority view?"  Marshall,  supra note 33, at 
16
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 Another basis for the contrasting treatment between the Ohio motto and the national 
motto may be the history and ubiquitous use of the national motto.102  Although the Ohio motto 
may not have enjoyed the ubiquitous use that the national motto has, it has enjoyed significant 
use throughout the state of Ohio.103  Since 1959, many Secretaries of State of Ohio have 
imprinted “With God All Things Are Possible” on their official forms and documents.104  The 
State Tax Commissioner, as well as other government officials, have done likewise.105  
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals fo r the Sixth Circuit did not consider the Ohio motto as 
ubiquitous as the national motto.106  Conceding that the national motto enjoys great history and 
ubiquity while the Ohio motto does not, cannot by itself compensate for the difference in 
treatment.107  History alone cannot protect an unconstitutional practice from the bite of the 
Establishment Clause.108 
                                                                                                                                                             
537.  In the absence of standardized criteria through which to assess Establishment Clause problems, the judge 
depends on his own predispositions and biases in reaching his decision.  Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 
43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 816 (1993). 
 
102 Extensive use of official mottoes, oaths of office, and legislative practices with religious undertones are 
constitutional because they are interwoven into this country’s history and tradition.  Schempp, 374 U.S. at 213.  
Justice Brennan, one of the more liberal justices in the history of the Supreme Court, would uphold the national 
motto because he believes the motto has lost its religious significance through persistent use in the history of this 
nation.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (terming “In God We Trust” an acceptable 
ceremonial deism).  Other members of the Supreme Court would uphold the constitutionality of the national motto 
because the effect on religion is inconsequential or indirect.  Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative As Liberal: The 
Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O’Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151, 187 
(1987). 
 
103 ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 210 F. Supp. 3d 703, 710 (6th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, No. 




105 Id.  
 
106 Id. at 725-26.  The Court of Appeals does not explain why the Ohio motto is not ubiquitous and does not address 
the standard of gauging ubiquity.  Id. By its decision, the court inherently suggests that Ohio’s motto is not part of 
the fabric of society.  See id. 
 
107 Ceremonial deisms do not pass Establishment Clause scrutiny simply because of their “historical longevity.”  
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  History and ubiquity are 
relevant to Establishment Clause analysis because they are part of the context that an objective observer must 
17
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B.  Neutrality and Secularism Are Not Interchangeable Concepts 
 On many occasions, the Court has commanded that all governmental action must remain 
neutral in regards to religion. 109  However, the concept of neutrality is indeterminate in 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.110  To compensate for the lack of direction that the 
neutrality principle provides, the Court has emphasized that neutrality is achieved through strict 
adherence to secular values.111  The Court of Appeals relied on the neutrality/secularism 
principle in rendering the Ohio motto unconstitutional.112  However, reliance on secularism is 
inherently problematic.   
                                                                                                                                                             
consider when evaluating whether the government’s action conveys a message of endorsement.  Id. at 630-31.  
However, history and ubiquity alone do not provide an “artificial exception” from the endorsement inquiry.  Id.  
Therefore, if the Ohio motto and the national motto are similar in all other respects, the fact that the national motto 
enjoys extensive history does not make the motto constitutional.  See id. at 630.  On the other hand, the Court cannot 
hold the Ohio motto unconstitutional solely on the fact that it lacks ubiquity. See id. 
 
108 The Supreme Court, in Walz v. Tax Commission, expressed this idea most appropriately when it stated “no one 
acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers 
our entire national existence and indeed predates it.”  Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970). 
 
109 E.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963).  See also  supra  note 88 and accompanying text.  For 
the unworkability of the neutrality concept, see generally Smith, supra  note 97, at 313-32 (suggesting that the 
neutrality concept is "so indeterminate as to be almost meaningless"). 
 
110 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  Although the concept of neutrality is inherently ambiguous, it is far 
more indeterminate in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  See Smith, supra  note 97, at 326-32.  This is so because 
the standard of gauging what is neutral depends on the untenable objective observer test.  Id.  Despite the fact that no 
one knows who is the objective observer, Marshall, supra note 33, at 516-17, the objective observer has to gauge 
whether the government’s action has the effect of favoring or endorsing religion, Smith, supra  note 97, at 329-32.  
Invariably the government will act in ways that indirectly favor or endorse religion or irreligion.  Id.  In order for 
neutrality to be a sound foundation for Establishment Clause analysis, the courts should focus on distinct and 
measurable criteria rather than the "objective" perception that the government is endorsing religion or irreligion.  Id. 
at 328. 
 
111 The Court prefers the secular view because it does not favor atheism or an antireligious state.  Allegheny, 492 
U.S. at 610; Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 681-82 (1992) 
(noting that Establishment Clause jurisprudence privileges secularism while "marginalizing" religious beliefs).  
Secularism is  “indifference to or rejection or exclusion of religion and religious considerations.”  MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1056 (10th ed. 1993).  Under the auspices of the Establishment Clause, 
secularism means that the state may only take a position when that position can be supported empirically and 
rationally.  Gedicks, supra , at 693. 
 
112 See ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703 , 725 (6th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, No. 
98-4106, 2000 WL 1016751 (6th Cir. July 14, 2000) (en banc).   
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Secular beliefs are many times adverse to religious views.113  The goal of secularism in 
privatizing114 religion fosters hostility toward religion. 115  Even if secular views are not contrary 
to religious ones, requiring the government to speak only in secular perspectives and to be 
completely silent116 about religion belittles “religious views by making them seem irrelevant, 
outdated, or even strange.”117  Belittling religion has the unmistakable effect of favoring 
“irreligion” over religion. 118  The Establishment Clause does not condone the government’s 
favoring irreligion over religion. 119   
One may argue that such hostility toward religion does not exist because no justice on the 
Supreme Court has ever advocated that the government remain completely silent as to 
religion. 120  In fact, the Court may never require complete silence because it privileges 
                                                 
113 For example, museums oftentimes contain displays portraying the "Big Bang" theory that is incongruous to the 
religious tenets of many religions.  Wallace, supra  note 41, at 1195.  When such incongruity exists, adopting secular 
views fosters hostility toward religion.  Id. at 1195-96. 
 
114 Privatization of religion refers to prohibiting the government from speaking on matters that are not objective or 
subject to reason such as religion.  Gedicks, supra  note 111, at 675.  Supporters of this doctrine feel that religion is a 
private matter on which the government should not comment.  Id.  Government should only be able to comment on 
public matters.  Id. 
 
115 The concept of keeping religion afar from public life, keeping it privatized, can never be neutral, because religion 
always takes positions on issues in public life.  George W. Dent, Secularism and the Supreme Court, 1999 BYU L. 
REV. 1, 60.  Thus, when the government speaks secularly, it always speaks against those religions that do not share 
the secular views.  See id. 
 
116 The Supreme Court, or any of its members individually, has not promoted doing away with all religious content 
in government speech.  Wallace, supra  note 41, at 1202-03.  However, the effect of keeping government’s 
completely secular comes dangerously close to forbidding the government from making any religious statements.  
See Dent, supra  note 115, at 60.   
 
117 Wallace, supra  note 41, at 1200.   
 
118 See id. 
 
119 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 644 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 
120 Wallace, supra  note 41, at 1202-03.  Although some members of the Court have come close, no member has yet 
advocated for eradication of “all religious rhetoric, symbols, and other religious references from government 
speech.”  Id. 
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governmental references to religion when the references are ceremonial deisms.121  Of course, 
this reasoning is flawed because a practice is a ceremonial deism only when it has lost all of its 
religious significance through its longevity. 122  Consequently, only the ceremonial deisms that 
already exist may ever exist because any new religious practices that the government attempts to 
institute will not have the necessary longevity to constitute ceremonial deisms.123  In essence, the 
government must be silent as to any practices that still retain religious connotations.124  Such a 
requirement for silence fosters hostility toward religion, and because hostility toward religion is 
antithetical to the Framers’ intent, secularism is not a proper foundation for Establishment Clause 
analysis.125   
 Even if secularism is not hostile to established religions, it may still be an improper 
constitutional foundation.  Secular speech bears close affinity to secular humanist thought.126  
                                                 
121 See supra  note 41 and accompanying text.  One example is the national motto. 
 
122 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  In essence, the argument is circuitous.  
The argument is that the government is not totally prohibited from speaking religiously, but the religious practice of 
which it speaks must have lost its religious significance through time.  Id. 
 
123 See id.  Any new religious practices that the government attempts to institute will fail constitutional muster 
because they lack the history and ubiquity that renders them secularized.  Thus, if the practice cannot be instituted, it 
will never have a chance to lose its religious significance and can never be accepted as a ceremonial deism.  For 
example, if Ohio’s legislature attempted to institute a Bible reading at the opening of each session, the practice 
would be held unconstitutional because it has not lost its religious significance through ubiquitous use and history.  
Two hundred years from now, the practice will still be unconstitutional because it still lacks the requisite history 
since it could not be instituted. 
 
124 But see id. at 715 (asserting that certain governmental practices may retain their religious undertones so long as 
they are continued for their secular reasons). 
 
125 Justice Goldberg announced in School Dist. v. Schempp: 
[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results 
which partake not simply of that noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious which the 
Constitution commands, but a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and passive, or even 
active, hostility to the religious.  Such results are not only not compelled by the Constitution, but, 
it seems to me, are prohibited by it. 
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 
126 Compare supra  note 111 and accompanying text to infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. 
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Some legal scholars consider secular humanism to constitute a religion. 127  If so, secular 
humanism is subject to the reach of the Establishment Clause.128  Because the concept of 
secularism favors secular humanism129 over all other religions by allowing the government to 
speak only of those things that are scientifically verifiable,130 neutrality and secularism are not 
proper underpinnings for Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
C.  The Plethora of Religions Drastically Limits What the Government May Say 
 Although the concept of religion is difficult to define,131 commentators report that the 
number of religions is growing in the United States.132  Not having a guide with which to identify 
                                                 
127 “Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence 
of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.” Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 
495 n.11 (1961).  In Schempp, Justice Stewart warned, “refusal to permit religious exercises thus is seen, not as the 
realization of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a religion of secularism . . . .”  Schempp, 374 U.S. at 
313 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Rhode Island Fed’n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 850, 854 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(suggesting that secular humanism may constitute a religion); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1534 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (suggesting that secular humanism may constitute a religion). 
 
128 Secular Humanism falls under the auspices of the First Amendment.  See Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.11. 
 
129 The concept of neutrality prohibits the government from speaking unless the content of which it speaks is 
empirically verifiable.  See supra  note 111 and accompanying text.   In essence, the concept of neutrality advances 
secular humanist thought because secular humanists  believe that nothing exists except that which is real or 
observable.  See infra  note 130 and accompanying text.  Contrastingly, neutrality inhibits religious references since 
almost “all religions believe that reality extends beyond the confines of sensory experience.”  Ingber, supra  note 1, 
at 279. 
 
130 Among other beliefs, secular humanists believe that there is no God and that man is the ultimate power.  Andrew 
W. Austin, Faith and the Constitutional Definition of Religion, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1991-92).  Secular 
humanists also believe that only things that can be empirically measured or observed are real.  Id.  This belief 
constitutes faith more than scientific reality because science has not proven that only observable things are real.  
Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm’rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 982 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev’d , 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(overruling the decision without addressing the lower court’s classification of secular humanism as a religion).  
Because the belief relies on faith, secular humanism may constitute a religion.  Id. 
 
131 Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 762 (1984).  The concept 
of religion is so intricate that dictionaries are unable to reach a uniform definition.  Id. at 762-63.  One commentator 
suggests that in order to constitute religion a belief must not only be normative but it must also have a compulsive 
flavor to it.  Note, supra note 3, at 1476-77.  Others define religion based on its relation with the life of an 
individual, while others depend on its content or characteristics.  See, e.g., Austin, supra  note 130, at 7.  The 
Supreme Court has never officially defined religion.  Greenawalt, supra , at 759.   
 
132 See, e.g,. Stephen J. Stein, Religion/Religions In the United States: Changing Perspectives and Prospects, 75 
IND. L.J. 37, 52-54 (2000). 
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religious practices, courts have resorted to their own idiosyncratic tests in order to identify 
religious practices and to subject them to the Establishment Clause.133  If the Establishment 
Clause forbids the government to speak from Christian text because such words “demonstrate a 
particular affinity toward Christianity,”134 it must also forbid references from other religious 
texts.135  Consequently, with the number of religions growing,136 and with them the number of 
religious texts, there is a realistic fear that what the government “says” may be unconstitutional 
because it is contained in a certain religious text.137  The government cannot take preventative 
measures by assessing the religious significance of what it says, because there is no standardized 
definition as to what constitutes religion. 138  Furthermore, the government cannot satisfactorily 
assess the constitutionality of its speech because of the unpredictability of the “objective 
observer” test.139  Thus, with the growing number of religions and the lack of standards with 
                                                 
133 E.g., Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that although a practice was religious in 
the past, it must have "current religious adherents to be considered religious); Abdool-Rashaad v. Seiter, 690 F. 
Supp. 598 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that "Universalism," a religion created in prison, is not a religion under the 
Establishment Clause because it lacks support outside the prison); Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa 
1973), aff’d, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that Eclatarianism is an established religion because its 
followers believe in Eclat, an inanimate and ultimate power much like the Christian God);  Wright v. Raines, 571 
P.2d 26 (Kan. App. 1977) (relying on a text that identified the requirements of a Sikh follower in construing Sikh 
Dharma to constitute an established religion).  
 
134 ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 727 (6th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, No. 98-
4106, 2000 WL 1016751 (6th Cir. July 14, 2000) (en banc). 
 
135 The concept of neutrality requires all religions to be treated equally and not to prefer or disparage any one 
religion.  School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963). 
 
136 See Stein, supra note 132, at 52-54. 
 
137 Whether the government knows of the origin of the words is relevant to the purpose prong of the Lemon test and 
the legislative intent prong of the endorsement test.  See supra  notes 26 and 29 and accompanying text.  However, in 
the effect and endorsement prongs of the same tests, it is irrelevant whether the government knew the origins of the 
words so long as the words endorse religion when read in context.  See supra  notes 29 and 32 and accompanying 
text. 
 
138 See supra  notes 130 and 133 and accompanying text. 
 
139 See Rezai, supra  note 13, at 533-34.  See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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which to recognize them, the government runs the risk of violating the Establishment Clause any 
time it speaks.140   
The risk is enhanced if courts are to measure the government's actions through the eyes of 
an uncertain objective observer who is aware of the meaning of the text from where the 
governmental speech derived.141  In an attempt to comport with the Sixth Circuit's Establishment 
Clause analysis, the government would be wise to keep quiet on most matters.142  This would 
have a chilling effect on governmental speech and it is certainly not what the Framers envisioned 
for the Establishment Clause.143 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the darkness of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit had a chance to provide a guiding light with its decision in the “Ohio State Motto” 
case.144  Unfortunately, the court reached its decision without announcing practical standards 
with which to guide future analysis of Establishment Clause issues.  The Court simply relied on 
                                                 
140  As discussed earlier, the Establishment Clause demands the government to treat all religions equally, to not favor 
one religion over other religions.  See supra  note 100 and accompanying text.  With the growing number of 
religions, it is clear that the government needs to be hypervigilant so as to not offend any of the religions, old or 
new.  However, it is difficult to be hypervigilant when there is an aura of uncertainty as to what constitutes a 
religion.  See Rezai, supra  note 13, at 533-34.   
 
141 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit used such a standard with which to assess the constitutionality of the 
Ohio motto.  See supra  notes 71-74.  With the Sixth Circuit's objective observer test, not only can the government 
not speak in terms that might advance or infringe a religion, but also it appears that the government cannot use 
phrases from texts that the court might interpret as sending a religious message.  See supra  notes 71-74 and 
accompanying text. 
 
142 See supra  notes 129-33, 140 and accompanying text. 
 
143 History shows that the founders of the Constitution never meant for the government to remain speechless on 
religious matters.  See Wallace, supra note 41, at 1231-54.  Once they developed the language of the Establishment 
Clause, the founders continued to approve of legislative prayers, establishing certain days as official days of prayer, 
and  myriad references to God or a higher being in official documents, presidential addresses, etc.  Id.  
 
144 The court was faced with a question that the Supreme Court has never confronted: whether an objective observer 
is aware of the contextual origin of the government’s speech.  See supra  note 68 and accompanying text.  In holding 
that governmental speech must always be evaluated in light of its textual origin, the court impermissibly expanded 
23
Verginis: ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001
 24
its own expansion of the hypothetical “objective observer” as an individual not only aware of the 
physical context of the government’s speech, but also of the textual context.145  Now, in order for 
courts to assess the constitutionality of governmental speech, they have to make an initial inquiry 
as to the meaning of the original text.146  Then, the courts have to inquire whether an “objective 
observer” would perceive the meaning of the speech to favor religion over irreligion or vice 
versa.147  This further complication of Establishment Clause analysis does not illuminate its 
jurisprudence.  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit failed to provide a measure – a light – 
with which to “distinguish between real threat and mere shadow.”148  Consequently, darkness 
still prevails over Establishment Clause jurisprudence, thereby eliminating all shadows and 
rendering all governmental speech as a potential threat.  
 
Theologos Verginis 
                                                                                                                                                             
the reach of the Establishment Clause, thereby, clouding the original boundary that the framers intended.  See supra 
notes 131-43 and accompanying text. 
 
145 ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d  703, 725 (6th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, No. 98-
4106, 2000 WL 1016751 (6th Cir. July 14, 2000) (en banc).  
 
146 If there are no competing, viable meanings, the inquiry is harmless, but if there are competing and viable 
meanings, the court has to chose one meaning over the other, thereby, supporting one sectarian definition over the 
other.  See supra  notes 98-101 and accompanying text. 
 
147 This is the crux of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
148 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (referring to what purpose the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment serves). 
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